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The free trade agreement between the U.S., Canada and Mexico had essentially the same 
objectives for the latter two countries: to have broader and securer access to their main market 
and create a more favorable environment for an outward-oriented economic growth. Canadas 
request to officially take part in negotiations between Mexico and the U.S. has been justified 
as tactical. Canadian authorities sought to improve several of the recently implemented 
clauses of the Canada US trade agreement such as the dispute-settlement procedure. By 
taking part in these negotiations, the Canadian government wished to improve the North 
American rules of origin. The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had, however, 
two positive effects on Canada-Mexico relations. It created more dynamic trade relations 
between the two countries and it played the role of a cooperation catalyst, transforming a 
friendly relationship into a strategic partnership. 
Market liberalization and harmonization of necessary regulations in the North American 
region, which may be qualified as an emerging regime, obviously played a great role in this 
new cooperative relationship. Mexico became, to Canada, a potential strategic partner with 
which it wished to develop closer economic and diplomatic relations, as well as approaches, if 
not solutions, to problems of common interest. This relative closeness has also enabled both 
countries to gain a better understanding of each other and to establish a permanent mutual 
dialogue that is equally beneficial to both businesses and civil associations, as well as both 
countries population in general. Finally, with its own international policy agenda, Canada 
possibly intends to use its partnership with Mexico to extend its relations with other countries 
of Latin America, as well as to assert its own interests and mark its values in the institutions 
of an emerging community of the Americas. 
This new Canadian-Mexican proximity is therefore not only visible on a commercial basis, 
but also on a political basis. And everything indicates that bilateral, economic, cultural and, 
above all, diplomatic relations between these two countries will continue to expand and 
increase in the future. However, if in a short period of time these relations had seen, from the 
Canadian governments perspective, spectacular developments, we can not underestimate 
the fact that, because the U.S. is economically and geographically occupying a central 
position in the northern part of the Americas and in the south of the Western Hemisphere, 
relations between these two countries will always remain secondary to those Canada and 
Mexico have separately with their powerful and hegemonic neighbour. Another important 
issue is the strategic partnership that Canada intends to have with Mexico, is held in the 
context of competitive integration into the global economy. Trade matters are not only a main 
priority of both countries, but each plays, outside of their relationship with the U.S., their own 
trade game on the continent and elsewhere, as is shown by numerous trade agreements that 
both countries have signed or are presently negotiating. Finally, bilateral economic relations 
between Canada and Mexico, having seen substantial developments since NAFTA took 
effect, are to be seen in the context of a "deep integration" process in the Americas, a 
framework in which integrative dynamism comes more from corporations than governments. 
Considering these remarks, we will try in the following pages to bring bilateral Canada-
Mexico relations back into the context of NAFTA and to draw up a first report. The text is 
divided into two major sections. In the first section, we will examine bilateral relations 
between Canada and Mexico from a historical perspective and a Canadian perspective. It is 
also from a Canadian perspective that we will examine in the second section economic 
relations between the two countries, particularly in the context of integration, in which not 
only two, but three countries are involved in the game of competition. Two conclusions come 
out of this study. First of all, with regards to commercial and strategic Canadian government 
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objectives, results are quite weak and do not quite reach their expectations. Second, Mexico, 
so far, has benefited more from this new partnership than Canada, a result that questions the 
strategy adopted by the Canadian government to assert its values and interests in the 
Americas.  
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CANADIAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS 
AN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
From the Third Option to the Free Trade Agreement 
It was during the Second World War, in 1944, that Canada first established diplomatic 
relations with Mexico. Relations between the two countries did not, however, have any 
significant developments before the 70s. Canada had, until then, paid little attention to what 
was happening in Latin America. 
The joint wishes of Canadas Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau and of Mexicos President L. 
Echeveria for their respective countries to play a more important role in the international 
scene and reduce their economic dependence on the U.S. favoured harmonization and the 
development of closer relations2. A first step had already been made in this direction with the 
creation in 1968 of the Canada-Mexico Joint Ministerial Committee. Becoming a cornerstone 
of this closeness, this committee would be, and still is today, the main forum for cooperation, 
discussion and exchanges between the two governments on economic, political, commercial 
and cultural matters of mutual interest. The White Paper of 1970, Politique étrangère au 
service des Canadiens3, first stated a strategy for Latin America that would later reinforce the 
geographical trade diversification policy conducted during the Third Option and the North-
South intermediation policy the Canadian government would pursue. The latter policys main 
objective was to increase economic trade with the rest of the continent, privileging relations 
with Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela. It also aimed, among other goals, to develop a properly 
Canadian attitude towards problems in the American hemisphere, to contribute to economic 
development in Latin America, to encourage cultural and scientific exchanges and to facilitate 
a better mutual understanding4. 
In August 1971, measures taken by Nixon, with important consequences in both Canada 
and Mexico, and the tense relations with the U.S. that followed the adoption of more 
nationalist policies by both countries had the effect of bringing Canada and Mexico much 
closer.5 For example, they would incidentally adopt a similar position on issues with Cuba, 
Chile, and later, conflicts in Central America. Both countries were seeking at the time for a 
third way, i.e. to break away from American economic and political influence and to find 
their place in an international system, then divided East-West on one axis, and North-South 
on the other. In Canada, this redefinition of foreign policy would take place in the context of 
what would commonly be called, since 1972, the Third Option6. In Mexico, it would take 
place, under the presidency of L. Echeveria (1970-1976), in the context of the 
                                                          
2 For this topic, see Cary HECTOR (dir.), Canada-Mexique : autonomie et interdépendance dans les années 80, 
Montreal, Research note no. 37, Political Science Department, May 1989. 
3 Canada, Secrétariat aux Affaires étrangères, Politique étrangère au service des Canadiens, Ottawa, 
Approvisionnements et Services Canada, 1970. 
4 We will notice that at that period, Canadian exporters and investors were asked to respect host countries policies 
and interests. 
5 See, D. BRUNELLE et C. DEBLOCK.,  Le Canada, les États-Unis, le Mexique et la continentalisation de 
l'économie nord-américaine , in Cahiers de recherche sociologique, vol. 6, no 1, Spring 1988, pp. 63-78. 
6 See, D. B. DEWITT and J. J. KIRTON, Canada as a Principal Power, Toronto, John Wiley & Sons, 1983; 
André DONNEUR, Politique étrangère canadienne, Montreal, Guérin édition, 1994. 
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implementation, of what an author called a new foreign policy7 This policy, aimed to 
resolve the economic and political crisis in the country, was meant to defend Mexicos 
financial autonomy, by leaning for instance on the oil sector, and therefore to improve the 
countrys negotiation capacity in international forums, while also distancing itself from the 
U.S. with respect to foreign policy in Latin America8. 
Despite the measures imposed and concerted efforts, neither Canada nor Mexico 
succeeded, in any case, to be really independent commercially or economically from the U.S. 
The decline of commercial operations by Americans in both countries was considered to be 
more a temporary phenomenon9 than a lasting phenomenon. In addition, the political and 
diplomatic proximity between the two countries was not really based on commercial trade, 
which remained of low importance during the 70s. Not until the 80s, with the signing of an 
oil agreement between Canada and Mexico in 1980, would commercial trade links really 
increase; imports from Mexico raised considerably. This having been note, in 1980, Canada 
represented barely 1.7% of Mexicos imports and 0.8% of its exports. In 1989, these 
percentages were 1.2% and 1.7% respectively10. According to Canadian sources, in the same 
year Canadian exports to Mexico increased to $610 million Canadian and imports were at $1 
705 million. At the time Canada was Mexicos 4th largest market for exports and the 5th 
largest supplier for imports, whereas Mexico was only the 16th largest market for Canadas 
exports and the 9th largest supplier11. As for investments, the results would not be quite as 
good and would even decrease during the 80s. 
Because the results were not quite as good as expected, Canada would once again abandon 
the Latin America market during the 80s, particularly Mexico, while still taking part 
politically in the Contadora peace process in Central America, as did Mexico, whereas the 
Reagan administration had opted to support the Contras. The debt crisis and economic crisis 
that would follow, would only push investors and businesses further away from the region. At 
that time, the main focus of the Canadian government, lead by Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney, was on three major priorities : constitutional reform, economic reform to get out of 
the crisis and trade negotiations with the U.S. Similarly, Mexico would have essentially the 
same priorities, starting with economic and trade reforms that the De la Madrid administration 
(1982-1988) would undertake as political and constitutional reforms would be implemented 
with a "cautious" gradualism mainly in the next decade. 
The new Mulroney administration, after its election in 1984, proceeded rapidly in re-
examining Canadian economic and foreign policy12. The Agenda for Economic Renewal 
established new economic priorities for the government, focusing particularly on the 
reduction on the budget deficit, the increasing role of the market and the suppression of 
obstacles from public authorities opposed to private sponsorship in order to revitalize the 
economy. A while later, in Spring 1985, a green book, Competitiveness and Security, was 
                                                          
7 Mario. OJEDA, Alcances y limites de la politica exterior de México, Mexico, El Colegio de México, 1984, p. 188 
and following. 
8 For U.S.-Mexico relations, such as from the 60s to the beginning of the 80s, refer to Clark W. REYNOLDS and 
Carlos TELLO (eds.) (1983), U.S.-Mexico Relations, Economic and Social Aspects, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press; especially see the synthesis of Mario OJEDA (1983), The future of Relations Between Mexico and the 
U.S., in Reynolds and Tello (eds.), pp. 317-322. 
9 J. Z. VAZQUEZ and L. MEYER, México frente a Estados Unidos. Un ensayo historico, 1776-1980, Mexico, El 
Colegio de México, 1982, p. 214. 
10 In-bond industries not included. 
11 Dan CALOF, Trade with Mexico, Statistics Canada, 65-001, January 1991, pp. xi-xxi.  
12 For that period, see D. STAIRS and G. R. WINHAM, Quelques problèmes concernant l'élaboration de la 
politique économique extérieure, Ottawa, Les Études/Commission sur l'union économique et les perspectives de 
développement du Canada, Ministre des Approvisionnements et Services, 1986. 
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published by the government to demonstrate that it would from then on give main priority to 
economic and trade issues for its foreign policy, focusing on the bilateral relation with the 
U.S., who were receiving preferential treatment. In this manner the way was paved for the 
Free Trade Agreement with the U.S., signed on January 2nd 1988 and which would come into 
effect the 1st of January 1989. 
In Mexico, the debates on the "unbearable" external debt and the exhaustion of the Import 
substitution model (ISI) adopted since the 40s had, since the last years of the Lopez-Portillo 
administration (1976-1982), opened the path to the exploration of new strategies for economic 
growth. It was incidentally with the coming of De la Madrid (1982-1988) and during the 
spectacular debt crisis and the fall of oil prices that Mexicos economic and trade policy 
would change drastically and interest in free trade would increase considerably, beginning 
with a growing subscription to multilateralism in 1986 upon entry of the country into GATT 
and the formal study of a bilateral agreement with the U.S., its natural market, in the second 
half of the decade, mostly under the Salinas administration (1988-1994) even though the 
option had been discussed for almost a decade now. Entry into GATT as well the prospect of 
an agreement with the U.S. would coincide with an era of reform in Mexico, moving the 
economy from interventionist state policies to a dynamic of liberalization. These reforms 
would be essentially implemented on two levels, starting with domestic restructuring, 
dismantling, privatization and relaxation of rules relating to internal competition. For this type 
of restructuring of the domestic economy the government had opted for a selective 
interventionism on the industrial plane, consisting of stimulating the development of the 
manufacturing production ensured by the private sector and intended mainly for foreign 
markets, and would attempt to reduce the countries' vulnerability to the fluctuation of oil and 
agricultural goods' international prices. On an international level, these reforms would be 
completed by liberalization of Mexicos trade regime and the gradual displacement of trade 
barriers.  
Finally, it must be emphasized that free trade with the U.S was never presented in Mexico 
as an exceptional event. The agreement would be part of the official rhetoric of pursuing the 
implemented reforms as well as the countrys trade axis diversification project. Mexico 
signed, in 1991, a free trade agreement with Chile, announcing that negotiations with the U.S 
were being conducted in parallel with initiatives taken toward Latin America, Europe and 
Pacific-Asia. Many analysts saw in the agreement with Chile an attempt to mold public 
opinion and to disperse resistances in the prospects of a much more important agreement that 
would follow: NAFTA. Also, the Mexican government attempted to minimize the 
significance of this agreement and to carefully handle national sensibilities in Mexico. 
Mexican citizens were upset at the prospect of such an important harmonization with a 
country from which Mexico was, at least since the period of Revolution, seeking to keep its 
distance. The Salinas government asserted its interest in developing stronger economic and 
political relations with Canada, and, using the same rhetoric as Canada, eventually argued that 
adhering to NAFTA would enable it to defend and to secure its trade position vis-à-vis the 
U.S., while regionalism corrected competition and trade diversion effects that double 
bilateralism could have induced between Canada and Mexico. The Salinas government also 
highlighted the fact that an economic cooperation based on complementarity would give 
much more bargaining power to both countries over the U.S. It can not be forgotten that for 
Mexico, as for Canada, the option for regionalism was presented in the context of efforts 
undertaken towards multilateralism and the consolidation of a North American market would 
have constituted for both countries a kind of springboard to new markets. 
From Canadas perspective, NAFTA can also be viewed as a continuation of foreign 
policy objectives in Latin America, defined since 1989. Following the previous 
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administrations multilateralist and internationalist approach, the government would adopt, in 
1989, a new strategy for Latin America which would lead to Canadas membership to the 
Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1990. On February 1st 1990, the Secretary 
of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, would expose the five major objectives of this 
strategy, which were : (1) Development of foreign trade; (2) Payment of the national debt; (3) 
Fight against drug trafficking; (4) Maintenance of peace; (5) Help developing countries. He 
also claimed that Mexico would be the key to Canadas strategy in Latin America, a point 
that would be reaffirmed by Prime Minister Mulroney during his official visit to Mexico in 
March 1990. This strategy, however, would be altered by forthcoming events13. First, by the 
announcement made in June of the same year by the presidents of the U.S. and Mexico to 
open bilateral trade negotiations and then two weeks later by President Bushs launch of the 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative which would prepare the Americas for integration.   
The canadian request to take part in these negotiations was accepted. It had even been 
strongly supported by Mexican President Carlos Salinas during his official visit to Canada, in 
April 1991, to plead in favour of a North America free trade agreement. Launched officially 
on June 12th 1991, trilateral negotiations would be concluded on August 12th 199214. Finally, 
after several brief negotiations during the period of March to June of 1993 to fulfill the 
requests of the new American presidency with respect to environment and labour matters, the 
North America Free Trade Agreement was ratified by the three countries to become effective 
on January 1st 1994 as originally desired. As for the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 
even if was not as successful as expected, it had however contributed to change the United-
States' image in Latin America and to establish the foundations of a new economic 
partnership in the Americas, a formula that will be taken in account by President Clinton 
when launching his free-trade project for Americas in Miami in December 1994. 
 
From Free Trade to Strategic Policies 
The Mulroney Administration reoriented Canadas foreign policy to focus mainly on 
economic and trade issues, then the governments top priorities. Leading the country again in 
1993, the Liberal Party of the Canadian government, headed by Jean Chrétien, proceeded 
rapidly to re-examine this foreign policy, not to make any fundamental changes to it as he had 
promised during his electoral campaign, but rather to better target the priorities and adapt 
them to the new international context that resulted from the end of the Cold War, and also in 
the prospects of eventually expanding NAFTA over the entire continent. Even though this 
scenario would not be considered a main discussion topic during the Summit of the Americas 
in December 1994, the ambitious four section proposal (democracy, trade, poverty and 
environment) that was adopted at the Summit, nevertheless marked a major turning point in 
interamerican relations. The success of the Uruguay Round in 1994, which consequently 
                                                          
13 For this topic, see P. MCKENNA, Needed: A Policy for Latin America, Policy Options, 1993, May 14th, pp. 
27-28; E.J. DOSMAN, Canada and Latin America : The New Look, International Journal, XLVII, Summer, 
1992, pp. 529-554; M.A. CAMERON (1991), Canada and Latin America, in F.O. HAMSON and C.J. MAULE 
(dir.), After the Cold War, Canada Among Nations 1990-1991, Ottawa, Carleton University Press; G.W. 
SCHUYLER, Perspective on Canada and Latin America : Changing Context...Changing Policy, Journal of Inter-
American Studies and World Affairs, vol.33, no.1, Spring, 1991. 
14 See Sylvia MAXFIELD and Adam SHAPIRO (1998), Assessing the NAFTA Negotiations, U.S.-Mexican 
Debate and Compromise on Tariff and Non-tariff Issues, in Carol WISE (ed.), The Post-NAFTA Political 
Economy, Mexico and the Western Hemisphere, University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 82-
118; Hermann von BERTRAB (1997), Negotiating NAFTA, A Mexican Envoy's Account, Washington, DC, Center 
for Strategic International Studies. 
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created the WTO, was another significant event for the global economy as was the signing of 
GATT.  
It was in this new context that the federal government would publish, in February 1995, its 
foreign policy framework document, Canada in the World. Stressing its economic concerns, 
this text establishes three priorities for the Canadian foreign policy : (1) promote employment 
and Canadian prosperity; (2) protect the security of Canada; (3) promote Canadian values and 
culture. In order to promote employment and Canadian prosperity, the government would 
seek to have a more dynamic trade policy, better targeted and based on a more strategic 
evaluation of Canadian interests in the world. This approach defined three guidelines for 
Canadas trade policy : (1) to define more clearly the global economic priorities, mostly in 
Canadian export markets, to expand its traditional markets, as well as to intensify economic 
ties with strongly growing foreign markets; (2) to elaborate means to target more efficiently 
public programs and resources in order to help Canadian corporations conquer new markets; 
(3) to promote a national economic environment that is both appealing to foreign investments 
and favorable to growth based on exports.   
It is in the context of this new approach directly oriented on market globalization and 
partnership with the private sector that we can recount the several initiatives that would be 
undertaken, such as the implementation, in October 1995, of Team Canada, a governmental 
structure whose objectives where, among others : (1) to identify markets and sectors of 
priority; (2) to centralize and provide all useful information to domestic exporters and 
investors; (3) to enable them, through commercial attaché networks in particular, to have 
better conditions to access to foreign markets, to be more aware of evolutions and 
opportunities, as well as to give them an enhanced protection against discriminatory or 
anticompetitive measures, and to organize trade missions abroad; and finally, (4) to 
coordinate operations of different ministries, such as the Department of International Trade 
and Industry Canada, societies (for example, the Export Development Corporation), agencies 
(Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA), and other participants in the field of 
international economic affairs15. 
Canada’s International Business Strategy16, sets the new partnership guidelines the 
government intended to establish with the private sector. A summary of the guidelines are : 
(1) permanent consultation with the private sector for the definition of priorities; (2) widely 
released information rapidly available to corporations; (3) sensibilization of corporations to 
commercial perspectives offered by the opening up of market globalization. Thus, willing to 
link national growth to developments in the international market, the government was 
undertaking two complementary directives : the promotion of Canadian commercial and 
economic interests abroad as well as making Canada attractive for foreign investment on one 
hand, and, on the other, to strengthen and respect the clear rules of international trade for 
trade and investments17. 
                                                          
15 On this topic, see document Department of Foreign Affairs and International trade, Canadian Strategy for 1996-
1997 international trade, Overlook, (Ottawa, Team Canada, 1996) which contains the basics of federal 
government commitment toward Team Canada et Canadas trade priorities for the next ten years, Ouvrir des 
portes sur le monde : priorités du Canada en matière d'accès aux marchés internaitonaux (Ottawa, 1999) 
16 Team Canada/Équipe Canada, Canada's International Business Strategy. 1996-1997, Ottawa, 1995 
17 In the field of promotion and protection of foreign direct investment, Canada negotiated 26 agreements between 
1989, the year the program was launched, and 1999. The most general one negotiated with the U.S. and Mexico in 
the context of NAFTA serves as a model. 
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A brief overview of this strategy, at least of its commercial dimension, can be found in a 
text on Mexico, Mexico Trade Action Plan 18. In this text, the government divides its plan into 
five fields : (1) Market information and analysis; (2) Market intelligence; (3) Market access; 
(4) Outreach and Awareness; (5) Trade promotion events. In addition, the department 
identifies five priority sectors for Mexico, such as advanced manufacturing technology and 
industrial machinery, information technology and other advanced-technology products and 
services, agriculture and agro-food, automotive maintenance equipment and aftermarket parts, 
oil and gas equipment and services; five emerging sectors such as environmental equipment 
and services, mining equipment and services, cultural and educational products and services, 
electric power equipment and services, and transportation equipment and services; and three 
future growth sectors such as geomatics, medical/pharmaceutical/biotechnology, and safety 
and security. 
With the opening of hemispheric trade negotiations (officially taking place in Fall 1998, 
after the Santiago Summit), an agreement should be reached at the latest by 2005 which will 
implement the Free Trade Area of Americas. As a result, Canada had to redefine its strategy 
in Latin America. In these negotiations Canada, like Mexico, continued with its own agenda19. 
These priorities can be summarized in three points : (1) to establish clearer rules in trade and 
investment matters; (2) to extend its trade relations with Latin America; (3) to assert its 
interests and mark its own values in institutions of Americas developing community. It is for 
this reason Canada played an active role, along with the U.S. and Mexico, in these 
negotiations, strongly taking part in several issues (particularly democracy and rights of the 
individual), firmly present in panamerican institutions (mainly at the OAS), and mediating 
between its main protagonists, the U.S. and Brazil in particular.   
In parallel, in 1997 Canada would adopt a new strategy for Latin America, a region that 
offered, from the governments perspective, a lot of commercial opportunities poorly 
exploited by Canadian corporations. The text Latin America and Carribean Regional 
Strategy20 specified three priorities quite similar to the one we discussed above, which were : 
(1) the strengthening of the Rule of Law and the transparency in trade relations; (2) expanded 
and secure access to the markets of the rest of the American continent; (3) active participation 
from Canada in building new regional institutions in order to assert Canadian values and 
interests21. 
Canadas new commitment in the region is similar to other commitments elsewhere, aside 
from two points. For one, Canada has become much more aware than before of Latin 
American realities and of its own interests in that part of the hemisphere. Second, Canada 
does not want to let the U.S. determine the values and principles on which future institutions 
of the Free Trade Area of Americas will be built. Also, for want of seeing positive trade 
results coming out of these actions nor to see Canada taking a main role in the hemispheric 
affairs, Canada has at least been able to gain sympathy in Latin America and in the 
Caribbean, thanks to its important diplomatic and commercial efforts. It should also be noted 
that this sympathy constitutes nevertheless an important asset for Canada, who has everything 
to gain with respect to trade and finances. This social advantage will help Canada to 
                                                          
18 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Mexico and Inter America Division, Team Canada, 
1998. 
19 See, Paula WINOCUR, éLa zone de libre-échange des Amériques : de nouvelles relations interaméricaines ?é, 
Continentalisation, Cahiers de recherche, 00-07, June 2000, Montreal.(http://www.unites.uqam.ca/gric). 
20 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, 1997 (November). 
21 Joe MONFILS, Martin ROY, Gordon MACE and Jean-Philippe THÉRIEN, éLe Canada et la ZLÉA : 
Réflexions sur les stratégiesé, Canadian Foreign Policy, 1999, Vol. 7, n∞ 2, Winter, pp. 57-72. Also see Canada, 
Government Response to the report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, The 
Free Trade Area of the Americas : Towards a Hemispheric Agreement in the Canadian Interest, Ottawa, 1999. 
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distinguish itself from U.S. culture and politics that are still negatively perceived in the 
hemisphere, and so promote a business ethic and a sense of cooperation extending beyond 
canadian trade interests. 
 
 Mexico, Canada’s strategic partner 
Mexico has a particular place in Canadas hemispheric strategy, a tie that could be 
qualified as geo-strategic, since, as an economic partner, Mexico offers more of a potential 
market that has been actually exploited until now. For one, Canada would like to have closer 
relations with this country than with the other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
probably because of its geographic proximity and their comparable situations as privileged 
trade partners with the U.S. It must be said that Mexico is in a particular position of trust 
among Latin American countries, due to the fact that, being stable socio-politically on the 
continent, Mexico has for a long time been the land of exile for political refugees from 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay and others, and has gradually become an influential 
player among Latin Americas intellectual and political elite. Because of its privileged 
position in the hemisphere, Mexico constitutes for Canada an influential intermediary with the 
rest of the continent. As well, NAFTA has permitted the development of a new partnership 
between Canada and Mexico that appeases three concerns : (1) to maintain the trade relation 
and extend the dialogue between the two countries in a climate of better mutual 
understanding22; (2) to distinguish itself from the U.S. on certain sensitive issues (e.g. culture 
and immigration), even if, ultimately, Canadas positions in trade matters are quite close to 
those of the Americans; (3) to defend common positions on matters of mutual interest, 
foremost in the Agreement of Americas, but also in other international forums. This approach 
essentially reflects that of Mexicos, who pursue more or less the same objectives as Canada, 
and enhances initiatives on the international scene, while seeking to carefully handle the 
strategic relation struck up with the U.S. through NAFTA. 
Indeed since NAFTA, which constitutes the most important free trade agreement for 
Mexico because of the scope of its trade relationship with the U.S., Mexico successfully 
signed many trade agreements as well as various economic and financial agreements. In total, 
Mexico takes part in approximately 9 different free trade agreements, where six have been 
ratified after NAFTA under Zedillos administration (1994-2000  for instance with Chile 
(1991), NAFTA (1994), G3 (Venezuela, Colombia) (1994), Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Bolivia 
(1998), Israel (2000) and the European Union (2000). It is quite difficult to count exactly all 
the foundational agreements and economic and financial agreements Mexico holds with 
multiple partners in the Americas and elsewhere. Mexico presently negotiates in many 
directions and with different partners, such as with Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, Japan, 
Thailan, Switzerland, Island, Norway, Liechtenstein, while actively continuing a regional 
agenda constituting Mercosur and the Free Trade of Americas zone. Mexico now ranks 8th in 
world exports and 7th in world imports in international trade and has become a major 
commercial and strategic player in its hemispheric space. 
Canada has developed a very close cooperative relationship with Mexico23. This bond is 
reflected by official and non-official meetings and visits that became more and more frequent 
                                                          
22 Ex-minister of International Trade, S. Marchi, before the opening of the 13th meeting of Joint Ministerial 
Committee, éCanada wants to explore with Mexico, a key voice in the hemisphere, co-operative efforts to further 
trade liberalization in the context of wider, shared values.é (February 16th 1999) (http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/mexico/frnews-e.asp 
23 It is interesting to notice that convergence of opinion between Canada and Mexico is indeed on many issues. 
Thus for example, while economic integration comes with de facto dollarization, the Governor of Bank of Mexico, 
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and regular. Some examples include President Zedillos visit to Canada in 1996 and Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien in Mexico in 1997 and 1998, meetings outside of international events 
(i.e. OAS, APEC, Summit of Americas), the Team Canada mission in Mexico in 1998 led by 
the Governor General, ministerial and inter-ministerial meetings, during the convening of 
NAFTAs Commission and during Canada-Mexico Joint Ministerial Committee, as well as 
official trips of provincial ministers or state governors. The contacts became also more 
technical and involved more and more non-state actors (corporations, NGO, universities, 
etc.). The field of topics broached were also extended and more attention is now paid to 
following up on cases and to the implementation of adopted measures and arrangements in 
joint action plans. 
The two pivotal institutions of the Canada-Mexico relation are the NAFTA Commission 
and the Canada-Mexico Joint Ministerial Committee. The NAFTA Commission, on which the 
ministers of Trade for the three signatory countries are seated, has the mandate to ensure that 
the Agreement is implemented, indeed even to accelerate its implementation24, to assist in 
resolving commercial disputes, to extend negotiations to new areas, and to oversee the work 
of committees, working groups and auxiliary parts of NAFTA. A forum for cooperation, 
discussions and inter-ministerial exchanges, the Canada-Mexico Joint Ministerial Committee, 
created in 1968, now has, since 1990, meetings on a regular basis (every 12-18 months) in 
each country alternately, with a definition of a foundational agreement on trade and 
investment aimed to establish mechanisms of bilateral consultation. During these meetings all 
political and commercial or other common interest issues are discussed. 
The turning point in Canada-Mexico relation was obviously the visit of President Zedillo 
in Canada in June 1996 during which a Statement of objectives for Canada-Mexico relations 
along with an Action Plan was adopted. Focused on convergence, coincidence and 
complementarity, this Action Plan has since been reviewed and extended several times, most 
notably during the 12th and 13th Joint Inter-ministerial Committee meetings (December 1996 
and February 1999). The general principles remain however the same. The Plan aims to 
extend and to deepen a relation based on geographical and commercial ties, in three directions 
: political dialogue, social dialogue, and commerce and economy25. To these directions, are 
also added environment, communications, culture, science and technology, and other themes 
such as agriculture, tourism, finance, statistics, etc. 
For the moment, without being as profound as the Canada-U.S. relation, the bilateral 
Canada-Mexico relation is nevertheless conducted in a context of intergovernmental 
cooperation that also intends to converge and harmonize both countries domestic policies 
and develop common positions regarding the U.S., major international institutions (from 
WTO to OAS), and also the project of the Americas. It is significant to mention that in this 
respect more than 50 bilateral agreements, among which more than 40 have been signed since 
1990, govern relations between the two countries. In this way, we can say that if NAFTA 
became a powerful engine in the economic convergence between the U.S., Canada and 
Mexico, it has also stimulated the beginning of a political convergence, presently of a lesser 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Guillermo Ortiz mentioned during a debate on dollarization at IMF that the convergence of opinion between 
Canada and Mexico in matters of changes and benefits that both would obtain from this floating exchange rate 
regime, to begin on the level of monetary independence and in face of IMF Economic Forum Dollarization : Fad 
or Future for Latin America, June 24 1999). 
24 Two series of accelerated elimination on tariff rights have been implemented, first on July 1st 1997 and for the 
second time on August 1st 1998. 
25 New directions : Canada-Mexico 1999 Declaration of objectives and action plan (http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/mexico/frnews-e.asp). 
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importance, but reflects nevertheless a certain trend in which a North American community is 
emerging, a community with whom Canada intends to cooperate actively.  
Several remarks must however be considered. 
First of all, this privileged relation developed between Canada and Mexico is done outside 
of the relations linking these two countries with the U.S. In a geopolitical and economic 
context, in which the U.S. is essential, it is difficult to develop close relations without passing 
through the U.S. intermediary, as indirect as it sometimes is. Neither Canada nor Mexico can 
forget that their corporations and their economy on a whole depend on the U.S., which 
remains their main market, their main supplier, their main source of investments and their 
main pool of technologies. In this regard, statistics speak for themselves: whether it is on the 
trade or investment level, the U.S. receive about 50 times more goods and Canadian funds 
than Mexico. In 1999 Canada-U.S. trade of goods reached approximately $570 billion CAD, 
compared to approximately $11 billion CAD in Canada-Mexico trade. Direct American 
investments in Canada reached in 1998 $147 billion CAD, $464 billion CAD in Mexican 
investments. As for direct Canadian investments, they reached $126 billion CAD in the U.S., 
but barely $2.2 billion CAD in Mexico.  
Trade (and its percentage of growth) remains the cornerstone of this relation. This relation 
is not as straightforward as it is elsewhere, for example in Europe, going beyond mere inter-
governmental cooperation, with the exception of certain very specific areas. Despite 
undertaken reforms and trade liberalization, Mexico and Canada have very different cultures, 
customs and business guidelines. The cultural divergence between these two countries 
remains significant, much more significant than that between Canada and the U.S. More 
fundamentally, even if major efforts are made by both countries to extend this cooperation to 
other economic levels, to favour the harmonization of these cultures and to make non-
governmental actors more active, the political, social, cultural and scientific dialogue that has 
been established between the two countries is done outside of commercial and economic 
dialogue26. The notion of North American Community has still not been well elaborated, at 
least for now27.  
Finally, we must recall that, beyond the numerous mutual interests, Mexicos economy is 
in emergence, with a GDP per capita (PPP) three times lower than Canadas GDP and almost 
four times lower than that of the U.S. The gap is even larger if we consider the GDP in 
current $ (Table 1). With respect to the United Nations Human Development Index, Mexico 
is ranked 14th, compared to Canada, ranked 1st, and the U.S., ranked 2nd. We must not forget 
too that NAFTA is a heterogeneous economic space, quite far from qualifying as an optimal 
monetary zone. But most of all, it is a space marked by a double asymmetry: on one hand by 
an asymmetry that characterizes the relations between the U.S. and its two trade partners and, 
on the other hand, by one that takes into consideration that the agreement ties two developed 
                                                          
26 The theme of transnational civil activism, possibly stimulated through the NAFTA is of great interest, however, 
as the work of Jonathan Fox underlines, these civil networks, coalitions and social movements (by growing 
intensity) show to be nationally based and do not constitute this continental (or global) civil society activists claim 
to be representing. In all cases the development of such civil interactions among the United States and Mexico, the 
U.S. and Canada and more marginally Canada and Mexico, are of great concern for further research. See for 
instance J. FOX (2000), Assessing Binational Civil Society Coalitions : Lessons from the Mexico-US Experience, 
Santa Cruz, University of California in Santa Cruz, Chicano/Latino Research Center, Working Paper No. 26, Paper 
presented at the Latin American Studies Association, April 16-18, Miami. 
27 Although few studies have been undertaken on the cultural aspects of North American economic integration, the 
work of Ronald Inglehart, addressing the éamericanizationé of Canadian and Mexican cultural consumption 
patterns and political behaviors, needs to be mentioned. See more particularly R. INGLEHART, Miguel 
BASANEZ and Neil NEVITTE (1994), Convergencia en Norteamérica, comercio, politica y cultura, Mexico, 
Siglo XXI. 
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countries to one country still under development. It is also relevant to mention that social 
issues, particularly migration issues, were left voluntarily aside in the negotiation of NAFTA. 
Political reasons prevailed over those mentioned and priority was given to trade issues. The 
proposed argument that free trade development would both reduce migratory flood and social 
inequalities still has yet to be proven28. In Mexico several experts indeed estimate that the 
economic reforms undertaken during the 80s and enhanced by NAFTA, had immediate 
consequences of diminishing manufacturing employment and substantially increasing 
informal operations, reducing agricultural work and (substantially) displacing labour to urban 
zones in its first stage, and, in short, intensifying undocumented emigration to cities and 
southern rural areas of the United States. 
To summarize, if cooperative relations between Canada and Mexico have seen major 
developments since the mid 90s and are now more elaborated than they were before NAFTA, 
these relations need to mature as well as to venture off the beaten track than they have up to 
now in order to really see the foundation of a genuine partnership between two countries, that 
have many similarities but remain distanced from each other.  
 
Table 1 : U.S., Canada, Mexico, 
Selected Economic Indicators 
 
  U.S. Canada Mexico 
 
Surface (sq. km. 000) 
  
9372 
 
9976 
 
1973 
Population  1997 266.8 30.3 94.2 
(millions)     
GDP (PPP) 1998 8178.8 748.9 760.9 
(US $ billion)     
GDP/h (PPP) 1998 30514 24468 7998 
(US $)     
GDP/h  1997 29080 19640 3700 
(US $)      
GDP growth rate 1988-98 2.8 1.8 3.4 
(av. an. % change)    
 
 
Balance of trade  (as 
percent of GDP) 
1997 -1.4 1.6 0 
 
 
Exports. goods 1999 695 238.4 136.7 
Imports. Goods (US  
$billion) 
1999 1059.9 220.2 148.2 
 
Exports. services 1999 251.7 32.4 11.6 
Imports. services 1999 182.3 37.1 13.7 
(US $billion)     
R & D 1996 2.62 1.64 0.31 
(as percent of GDP)     
Source : OECD and World Trade Organization 
 
 
                                                          
28 For this topic, see OECD, Migration, Free Trade and Regional Integration in North America, Paris, 1998. 
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CANADA-MEXICO ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
IN A DEEP INTEGRATION CONTEXT 
 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has created a new situation, making 
the analysis of the Canada-Mexico analysis economic relation more difficult. Indeed, even if 
trade between these two countries and the U.S. have always been important, the creation of a 
unified economic space a new integrative dynamic is under way. The impact of Free Trade 
was not only a result of the fast elimination of customs tariffs, which were already quite low 
(not to say almost inexistent between the U.S. and Canada), but also a result of : (1) the 
elimination of a number of quantitative and regulative restrictions imposed on trade and 
investment; (2) the widening of conditions concerning access to markets, and the protection 
now given to investors and their investments; (3) the establishment of a mechanism for 
dispute resolution; (4) the adoption of criteria for rules of origin. 
The phenomenal increase in intra-NAFTA trade has been the most significant consequence 
of Free Trade, to the great satisfaction of the three countries involved. In reality, this 
consequence is not so important when compared to qualitative changes that resulted from the 
implementation of NAFTA. First of all, NAFTA created a climate of trust and transparency in 
business relations in this zone. Second, with its normative content, NAFTA (and, previously, 
FTA) created an economic environment extremely favourable for investments, production and 
trade intra-NAFTA, perhaps even at the expense of exchanges with Third World countries. 
Finally, enterprises saw their market potentials widen, thus favoring the reorganization of 
operations within the zone, and in return for the economies and sectors concerned, emergence 
of new specializations, factorial and intra-industrial.  
NAFTA, in fact, created an entirely new environment in the integrative process of North 
America favoring shallow integration, focused on bilateral trade and on-site investment, over 
what certain authors like to call deep integration, which is focused more and more within the 
zone, on organizations producing channels and networks and the development of intra-
industry trade and intra-firm trade. 
Without forgetting that the triangular relations remain deeply marked by the effect of 
attraction to the economy from its two neighbours, the American economy is the real centre 
of gravity of the North American area. Not incidentally, American enterprises, because of 
their very widespread and developed networks, are at the heart of this newly emerging 
integration model. Even though the polarization of trade by the U.S. within the NAFTA zone 
increased, this did not impede the development of business between Canada and Mexico, 
which remains, however, less significant compared with that which each country has 
developed with the United States. Both countries have found their own benefits from this new 
integration model, more so Mexico than Canada, but the shape and direction taken by this 
integration is escaping the hands of public authorities.   
Two points will be further discussed in this section. First, we will discuss what can be 
called the new triangle of Canada-U.S.-Mexico economic relations. We will follow with a 
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presentation of the places Canada and Mexico are trying to occupy within the triangle through 
their new bilateral partnership. 
 
The U.S.-Canada-Mexico triangle 
Three characteristics define the Canadian and Mexican economies within the North 
American triangle. They are very open towards foreign investment, very tied with the 
American economy and strongly integrated into networks for multinational firms. Let us 
examine these trends. 
Openness and transnationalization 
Three indicators have been considered : exports and import shares of the GDP, foreign 
direct investment shares of the GDP and the United Nations Transnationalization Index.   
Table 2 recapitulates statistics for trade and investments. It shows clearly the increasing 
importance of international trade and foreign investments for the economy for the three 
countries29. Free Trade is not the only factor contributing to this increasing trade with Europe. 
FTA and then NAFTA largely contributed to creating a favourable economic environment for 
trade and investment, thereby allowing Canada and Mexico to reach two of their objectives in 
their trade negotiations with the U.S. 
Growth in international trade was indeed extremely important to the three NAFTA 
countries during the 90s. Between 1990 and 1998, the average growth in exports per year 
was : 14.1 % for Mexico, 7.1 % for the U.S. and 6.7 % for Canada. The average growth in 
imports per year was : 15.8 % for Mexico, 7.8 % for the U.S. and 6.7 % for Canada30. In the 
three countries, the orientation towards exports and the penetration of imports increased 
substantially throughout the 90s in almost every sector of economic activity. The percentage 
of exports of goods and services of the GDP soared for the three countries during those years, 
more than 50 % to establish itself at 41 % of the GDP for Canada in 1998 (1999 : 43 %), 
more than 31 % for Mexico and almost 11 % for the U.S. Also worth mentioning, in 1998 
Canada and Mexico ranked 7th and 13th respectively in the world for the export of goods while 
the U.S. once again ranked a firm 1st, a position they had lost in the 80s. Recall that Mexico 
ranked 20th in 1990. 
As far as investments are concerned, the results are irrefutable. Between 1990 and 1998, 
the U.S. took more than a quarter of all foreign direct investments in the world; Canada and 
Mexico took about 2.5 %31. For itself, Mexico concentrated a quarter of all its direct 
investments between 1989 and 1998 on Latin America, equalling Brazil32. In 1980 Mexico 
represented 1.7 % of all direct investments in the world; in 1998 the percentage was 2.5 % 
(1990 : 1.9 %)33. From 1989 to 1998, Mexicos share in American foreign investment 
increased from 2.4 % to 2.6 %34. For Canada, the results are mixed.  
With foreign direct investment stock at more than 24 % of the GDP in 1998, according to 
data from Statistics Canada, and with abroad direct investments at approximately 27 % of 
                                                          
29 We will notice that figures are subjected to change according to the available sources. 
30 Source : World Trade Organization. 
31 United Nations, UNCTD, World Investment Report, 1999. 
32 CEPALC, Balance preliminar de las economias de America latina y el Caribe, Dec. 1999. See also, CEPALC, 
Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Carribean, 1999.  
33 United nations, UNCTD, World Investment Report, 1999. 
34 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business. 
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GDP, Canada is among the most outward of OECD countries in this domain. Furthermore, 
Table 2 shows that, although there has been an important increase in investments in Mexico 
these last years, out of the three countries Canadas economy remains the most dependent on 
foreign investment. This phenomenon works in both directions. Since 1996 Canadas direct 
investments outside of the country have become even more important that foreign 
investments in Canada.   
To add to this, however much direct investments have found their way back to Canada, we 
notice that Canadas share of foreign direct investments in the world has not stopped 
decreasing. Between 1980 and 1990 the numbers went from 11.3 % to 6.6 %, stopping at 3.5 
% in 1998. Also of concern, an Industry Canada study35 shows that since 1985 Canadas share 
of the total stock of North American foreign direct investments has continued to decrease. 
Approximately 16 % of the total in 1985, it dropped to 13.6 % by 1998. Between 1990 and 
1998, the decrease was 7.6 % and more than 90 % of this decrease is related to the reduction 
in investments received by Canada from the U.S. 
 
Table  2 : NAFTA, Foreign Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, 
percent of GDP, 1990, 1995, 1997-1998 
 
Trade (goods & services)       
   Exports 
 
  Imports 
 
 
(%) 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998  1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
            
U.S. 10.0 7.1 9.4 10.9 10.9  10.7 10.2 10.7 12.3 12.9 
Mexico 11.6 17.1 18.6 31.2 31.2  14.2 12.9 19.8 18.7 33.3 
Canada 28.2 28.2 26.1 37.3 41.1  26.4 25.8 26.0 34.2 39.1 
            
Stock of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
   
   Inward    Outward  
 
 
(%)   1990 1995 1997    1990 1995 1997 
 
U.S. 
   
7.2 
 
7.7 
 
8.4 
    
7.9 
 
10 
 
10.6 
Mexico   9.2 14.3 14.5    0.2 1.4 1.3 
Canada   19.9 22 22.3    14.9 21.5 21.3 
            
 
Sources : United Nations, World Investment Report, 1999 ; 
IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics and World Economic Outlook Database. 
 
The next table, Table 3, gives a more precise demonstration of the importance of triangular 
trade for all three economies. The table shows for each country the percent of the GDP of 
imports and exports with the other two countries. We also incorporated into the table data 
from other countries of the Western Hemisphere (Mexico excluded). Data is for 1990, 1995 
and 1997. Two conclusions result from this table. First of all, measured in % of the GDP, the 
intensity of trade reveals major contrasts among the three countries. In the three cases, 
triangular trade has gained importance, but while exports to Canada and Mexico from 1990 to 
1998 went from 1.9 % to 2.7 % of the GDP in the U.S. and the percentage of imports coming 
from these two countries went from 2.1% to 3.2%, the percentage of the GDP of exports to 
                                                          
35 Team Canada, The Trade and Investment Monitor, 1999-2000, op. cit., p. 29. 
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the U.S. during the same period went from 16.2 % to 30.3 % on behalf of Canada, and from 
7.2 % to 24.9 % for Mexico, while the percent of the GDP for imports from the U.S. to 
Canada went from 12.9 % to 22.4 % and those to Mexico increased from 7.6 % to 22.5 %. 
Another conclusion we can draw is that, although there has been an increase, trade between Canada 
and Mexico has remained limited and of secondary importance for both countries. Hence Canadian 
exports to Mexico represented in 1998 barely 0.1 % of the Canadian GDP and imports from Mexico 
have not exceeded 0.8 %. As for Mexico, exports to Canada were barely 0.7 % and Canadian imports 
reached 0.6 %. 
 
Table 3 : NAFTA, Trade Orientation Index 1990, 1995, 1998, 
Exports percent of exporting country's GDP (exporting country) 
 
1990 USA Can Mex LAC Others world 
U.S. * 1.4 0.5 0.4 4.5 6.8 
Canada 16.4 * 0.1 0.3 5.0 21.8 
Mexico 7.2 0.1 * 0.7 2.4 10.3 
1995 USA Can Mex LAC Others world 
U.S. * 1.7 0.6 0.7 5.0 8.0 
Canada 26.0 * 0.1 0.5 5.7 32.3 
Mexico 23.4 0.7 * 1.6 2.3 28.1 
1998 USA Can Mex LAC Others world 
U.S. * 1.8 0.9 0.8 4.4 8.0 
Canada 30.3 * 0.1 0.4 4.2 35.0 
Mexico 24.9 0.7 * 1.4 1.8 28.7 
 
Imports percent of importing country's GDP (importing country) 
 
1990 USA Can Mex LAC Others world 
U.S. * 1.6 0.5 0.6 6.2 9.0 
Canada 12.9 * 0.3 0.4 6.9 20.6 
Mexico 7.6 0.1 * 0.5 3.2 11.4 
       
1995 USA Can Mex LAC Others world 
U.S. * 2.0 0.9 0.6 7.1 10.6 
Canada 18.5 * 0.6 0.5 8.1 27.8 
Mexico 19.0 0.5 * 0.7 5.3 25.6 
       
1998 USA Can Mex LAC Others world 
U.S. * 2.1 1.1 0.6 7.2 11.1 
Canada 22.4 * 0.8 0.6 8.7 32.5 
Mexico 22.5 0.6 * 0.7 6.4 30.2 
Sources : IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics ; World Economic Outlook Database. 
Note : LAC : Latin America and Caribbean countries, Mexico not included.
 
 
Tables 2 and 3 indicate how important foreign trade and foreign direct investments are for 
all three economies. It is possible to get a better idea of the degree of integration of an 
economy into the network of transnational firms by combining, as do the authors of the World 
Investment Report, four variables for each country, the variables being : (1) foreign direct 
investment inflows in percentage of total investments during the last three years; (2) foreign 
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direct investment stock in percentage of the GDP; (3) value of foreign affiliates in percentage 
of the GDP; (4) employment of foreign affiliates with respect to total employment. Thus we 
obtain the transnationalization index. In order to be able to make comparisons, we have added 
Figure 1, showing the index for a certain number of Western Hemisphere countries for which 
we have data.  
Figure 1 shows that out of the three countries, the American economy is the least 
integrated into the network of transnational firms, whereas the Canadian economy is the most 
integrated. However an important remark must be made. The index is an index of external 
dependence and is not aimed to measure the relative importance of transnational firm activity 
to foreign countries in proportion to the economic activity of their own country. In other 
words, the index can only reveal the degree of dependence of the economy on transnational 
firms and not the importance of the operations of its own transnational firms in economies 
abroad. 
 
Figure 1 : Transnationalization Index, 1996 
Western Hemisphere, selected countries 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 
Costa Rica 
Chile 
Honduras 
Canada 
Jamaica 
Ecuador 
Peru 
Mexico 
Guatemala 
Venezuela 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Argentina 
       U.S. 
(%) 
Source : United Nations, World Investment Report, 1999. 
 
Intra-regional trade and asymmetric interdependence 
An increase in intra-regional trade, more specifically trade between the U.S. and its 
immediate neighbours, is a second trend revealed by trade data. These bilateral ties had 
always been close, as was already stated. However, the increase has been much more 
important than most of the studies conducted at the time of the signing of the two Free Trade 
Agreements anticipated. Crossed investments between the three countries also increased. But 
while the U.S. share in foreign investments remains high in Mexico, it had the tendency to 
decrease in Canada, for both incoming and outgoing investments.  
Intra-regional trade by the three NAFTA countries represents close to 10 % of the world 
trade. Between 1990 and 1999 intra-regional exports went from 6.9 % to 10.4 % of world 
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exports, and imports from 6.6 % to 10 % of world imports36. This triangular trade presently 
represents more than 50 % of total trade in North America versus approximately 35 % at the 
beginning of the 80s. These percentages should however be put into perspective. 
Despite the strong increase in trade with Canada and Mexico, the U.S. present a much 
more diversified trade balance on the geographical level than Canada and Mexico, who, 
contrary to initial expectations when signing the Free Trade Agreement, have depended even 
more on their main trade partner during the last decade. Thus together Canada and Mexico 
saw, from 1989 to 1999, their share in American exports rise from 28.1 % to 37 %, and from 
23.8 % to 29.8 % with respect to imports. In parallel, American shares between those years 
went from 70 % to 82.7 % of total exports and from 68.2 % to 74.3 % of total imports in 
Mexico, and from 70.7 % to 87.2 % of total exports and from 68.2 % to 74.3 % of total 
imports in Canada. 
Table 4 shows for each NAFTA country the share of the other two countries in total trade. 
We simply notice that, for exports, the U.S. share increased more than 10 percentage points 
of the total Canadian and Mexican exports between 1989 and 1999, but as for their imports, 
the increase was not as considerable. 
 
Table 4 : NAFTA : Bilateral Trade 
1989-1999, share of total exports and imports percentage 
 
 Exports         
 U.S.  Mexico  Canada 
 Canada  Mexico  U.S.  Canada  U.S.  Mexico 
1989 21.5  6.9  70.1  1.2  70.7  0.4 
1990 21.1  7.2  69.3  0.8  75.4  0.4 
1991 20.2  7.9  79.5  2.7  75.8  0.3 
1992 20.2  9.1  81.1  2.2  77.8  0.5 
1993 21.5  8.9  83.3  3  81.3  0.4 
1994 22.3  9.9  85.3  2.4  82.5  0.4 
1995 21.6  7.9  83.6  2.5  80.4  0.4 
1996 21.3  9.1  84  2.3  82.3  0.4 
1997 21.8  10.4  85.6  2  83.2  0.4 
1998 22.7  11.6  87.9  1.4  86.5  0.4 
1999 24.3  12.7  82.9  1.5  87.2  0.5 
            
 Imports         
 U.S.  Mexico  Canada 
 Canada  Mexico  U.S.  Canada  U.S.  Mexico 
1989 18.2  5.6  68.2  1.6  63.5  1.3 
1990 18.1  6  66.1  1.3  62.9  1.4 
1991 18.4  6.3  73.9  1.4  62.3  1.8 
1992 18.3  6.5  71.3  1.7  63.5  1.8 
1993 18.9  6.8  71.2  1.8  65  2 
1994 19.1  7.3  71.8  2  65.8  2.1 
1995 19.2  8.1  74.5  1.9  66.7  2.3 
1996 19.5  9.1  75.6  1.9  67.4  2.5 
1997 19.1  9.7  74.8  1.8  67.5  2.5 
1998 18.8  10.2  74.5  2.2  68  2.5 
1999 19.2  10.6  74.3  2.1  70  2.6 
                                                          
36 Sources, World Trade Organization, March 2000. 
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Sources : FMI. Direction of Trade Statistics ; World Economic Outlook Database.
 
 
Table 5 provides for each of the three countries shares of foreign direct investment of the 
other two countries. In the U.S., as in Canada, the American share of incoming investment 
stocks increased since NAFTA. Data from Statistics Canada also show that the U.S. was a 
main factor behind more than 70 % of cumulative net incomes in Canada between 1990 and 
199837. In fact, it was more like a take over by the U.S. Canada and Mexico received in 1997 
11.6 % and 3 % respectively of American global investments. The decreasing trend has been 
stable for Canada, but for Mexico, on the other hand, American investment shares in Mexico 
increased considerably these last years (from 1.8 % to 3 % between 1986 and 1997), while 
Canadian investment shares in Mexico also increased (from 0.3 % to 1 %). This will be 
discussed later on in the text. The table also indicates that out of total foreign investments 
received in Mexico, IDE shares originating from the U.S. slightly decreased (from 62 to 60 % 
between 1986 and 1997), and those from Canada slightly increased (from 2.1 to 2.7 % during 
that same period), which means that Mexico improved its position as a foreign investment 
receiving country, and attracted funds from regions other than from the United States such as 
Europe.  
 
Table 5 : Crossed Foreign Direct Investment, 
between U.S., Canada and Mexico, 
1986, 1995, and 1997. 
 
Share of Total Investment Stocks 
 
 Inward  Outward 
  
1986 
 
1995 
 
1997 
 
  
1986 
 
1995 
 
1997 
U.S.     
Canada 10.3 9.2 10.2  19.5 11.9 11.6 
Mexico na na Na  1.8 2.2 3 
        
Canada     
U.S. 72.1 67.5 69.3  68.3 52.4 51.6 
Mexico na na Na  0.3 0.7 1 
        
Mexico     
U.S. 62.3 59.8 60  na na na 
Canada 2.1 3.1 2.7  na na na 
 
Source : OCDE, Mesurer la mondialisation. 
Le poids des multinationales dans les économies de l'OCDE, Paris, 1999. 
 
Free Trade and corporative integration 
The U.S. is more than ever the real center of gravity of the North American economy. 
However, this status does not mean, as we will see in a later section, that trade and investment 
polarization is done at expense of Canada-Mexico relations. This translates into two facts. For 
                                                          
37 Statistics Canada, Canadian international investments report, 2000, n∞ 67-202. 
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one, that economic convergence within NAFTA is done around the U.S.38 Given the size of 
their economy, their dynamism and the actual strength of growth triggered by the new 
economy, the U.S. found the asymmetric interdependent relation binding its two neighbours 
to be enhanced by the liberalization of trade. Even if in numerous sectors Canadian and 
Mexican enterprises gained important market shares in the U.S., the same is true for the U.S. 
The number, size and dynamism work in favor of American enterprises. Two other more 
qualitative trends accompany these. The first being the trend to create, in Mexico and Canada 
in particular, between the transnationalized sector of the economy, a more dynamic and more 
competitive disjunction and the domestic sector. The second trend is as following. If NAFTA 
is without a doubt, along with the European Union, one of the most integrated economic 
regions in the world, this integration is principally conducted to the benefit of transnational 
enterprises, these having from now on more room to manoeuvre in penetrating markets. 
Despite their rich history and their increasing importance in the world economy, data 
available concerning the operations of transnational firms remains very limited and 
heterogeneous39. Industry Canada and Investment Canada conducted several studies that have 
shed light on the importance of foreign affiliates on the countrys total economy, as well as on 
intra-firm trade40. Industry Canadas recent study estimates 44.6 % of Canadian exports are 
attributable to enterprises of foreign affiliates based in Canada, likewise 51.2 % of imports. 
American affiliates alone are responsible for approximately 40 % of Canadas total exports 
and 41 % of imports41. Statistics published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis are 
along the same lines. 
American multinationals are in one way or another responsible for about 63 % of total 
U.S. exports and about 40 % of imports. Intra-firm trade represents more than a quarter of all 
U.S. exports and more than 42 % of total trade is related to multinationals. For imports, the 
percentages were 16.9 % and 42.1 % respectively in 1997. As shown in Table 6, for Canada 
multinationals trade with their affiliates or those of other groups make up about 45 % of the 
total U.S. exports and between 43 % and 42 % of their imports. Although, according to 
borrowed sources, the numbers had a tendency to fluctuate, the percentages are also very high 
                                                          
38 Most of the studies tend to show that NAFTA has little effect on the cycle of economic behaviour in Canada. 
However, in Mexicos case, we notice that the trend began for the harmonization of the economic cycle with the 
U.S. has increased since NAFTA. 
39 For this topic, see OECDs on transplants : OECD, Exchanges and investments : transplants, Paris, OECD, 
1994; Marcos BONTURI, and Kiichiro KUKASAKU, Globalization and Intra-firm Trade : An Empirical Note, 
Economic Studies of OECD, n∞ 20, spring 1993, pp. 145-159. See also R. J. RUFFIN (1999), The Nature and 
Significance of Intraindustry Trade, Economic and Financial Review, pp. 2-9, that estimates that around 80 % of 
U.S. trade with Mexico is intra-firm. Figures that the Mexican publication Comercio exterior, based on INEGI 
data, are less alarming and at 62,8 % (Comercio exterior, March 1998). 
40 Regarding these issues, see, Richard A. CAMERON, Commerce intrasociété des entreprises transnationales 
étrangères au Canada, Work document n∞ 26, December 1998, Industry Canada; Ronald CORVARI and Robert 
WISNER, Les multinationales étrangères et la compétitivité internationale du Canada, Investment Canada, Work 
document,n∞ 16, June 1993; and Lorraine EDEN, Les multinationales comme agents de changement : définition 
d'une nouvelle politique canadienne en matière d'investissement étranger direct, Ottawa, Carleton University, 
1994. 
41 Industry Canada studies show three interesting trends : First, the propensity of American affiliates in Canada to 
trade with their parent stores in the U.S. is much more important than Canadian affiliates in the U.S. (about 45 % 
for the American ones versus about 10 % for the Canadians for propensity to export). Secondly, intra-firm trade 
share in Canada and U.S. total trade is also much more important for Canada-U.S. trade than U.S.-Canada trade 
with Canada (about 70 % for the former case vs 53 % for the after case). In third, Canadas trade with the U.S. 
tends to extend to others States than those on the border of the two countries. ( Richard A. CAMERON, Commerce 
intra-société des enteprises trnansnationales étrangères au Canada, Industry Canada, Work document n∞ 26, 
December 1998; Industry Canada, L'accroissement des relations économiques entre le Canada et les États-Unis, 
1999; Christian DEBLOCK and Chrisitan CONSTANTIN, Intégration des Amériques ou intégration · l'économie 
américaine ?, Cahier de recherche du GRIC, March 2000,  http://www. unites.uqam.ca/gric/) 
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for Mexico, as much as a third of trade, a situation comparable to Brazil. We may consider 
that a major part of this trade is intra-firm.   
The tendency towards concentration, given by the increase of intra-firm trade, is seen in 
Mexico. Presently, Mexicos export sector is characterized by its concentration on a reduced 
number of products, the existence of a restricted number of exporting enterprises, generally 
large and by mainly American incoming and outgoing of products. Moreover, Comercio 
exterior (March 1998-99) estimates that around 63 % of Mexicos trade manufacturing 
transactions are intra-firm trade, mainly between Mexican affiliates and American mother-
firms.  
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Table 6 : US Multinationals' Trade with Affiliates 
percent of total US exports and imports 
1989, 1995 et 1996 
 
  Exports   Imports 
  1989 1995 1996  1989 1995 1996 
All countries 28.2 30.4 31.1  20.6 20.0 20.4 
Canada 46.9 45.5 44.4  45.8 43.2 42.1 
Latin America 25.7 26.3 27.4  20.6 25.2 25.4 
Mexico 31.0 36.7 36.5  27.1 31.4 32.2 
Brazil 32.0 27.5 30.2  23.7 23.0 26.5 
Europe  30.8 36.3 36.3  14.6 16.6 16.2 
Asia-Pacific 16.7 20.9 21.9  12.8 9.7 10.7 
 
Sources : Office of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, 
1998 ; September ; 1999, July.. 
 
Table 7 gives us two kinds of information on operations abroad of American 
multinationals under majority control. First of all, it shows us the geographical distribution of 
these operations with respect to 6 variables : assets, sales (total and goods only), gross 
product, employment, U.S. incoming imports and outgoing exports. The table then shows 6 
types of ratios : assets to sales, gross product per worker (in USD), net income to assets, 
imports and exports (incoming and outgoing from the U.S.) to sales, and R-D expenses to 
sales.  
Four remarks must be made. To begin with, even if it is not shown in the table, Canadas 
shares tend to generally decrease whereas Mexicos tend to increase. It is therefore 
particularly interesting to look at employment statistics. In 1989, Canadas American 
affiliates employed 903 500 people. In 1996 it went down to 832 000, but saw an increase of 
26 000 in 1997 to 858 300. In other words, between 1989 and 1997 the employment in 
Canada by American affiliates diminished significantly by 45 200 jobs. In parallel, for the 
same period employment in Mexico went from 328 000 to 530 700, which is an increase of 
202 700 jobs. The number of jobs also increased in 1997 compared with 1996, but more 
significantly than in Canada : 29 200 jobs. 
The next thing to notice is that trade by Canadian affiliates with the U.S. alone represents 
close to one third of the affiliates sales, a percentage, however, lower than what has been 
observed for Mexico : close to 50 % for exports and a little more than 43 % for imports. The 
ratio of assets to sales, an indication of capital turnover, is relatively low in Canada, 1.1 
versus 1.5 on average, but is higher than in Mexico : 0.7. The profitability of Canadian 
affiliates is comparable to that of affiliates in Europe. It is, on the other hand, lower than that 
which is found in Mexico, Brazil and Costa Rica, for example. 
Finally, we notice that the gross product per worker is much lower in Canada than in 
Europe, as well as in certain Latin America countries like Brazil, Argentina and Chile. It is, 
however, 3 times higher than in Mexico. In short, we can conclude from this analysis that 
Canadas American affiliates are well situated around the average with respect of 
profitability, productivity, and capital turnover. However, other countries of the continent, 
especially Mexico, show undeniable benefits, beginning with profitability, which is not 
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without its consequences on the direction of investments and the reorganization of operations 
within the NAFTA zone42. 
 
Table 7 : Operations of US Affiliates by Country Groupings : 1998 
 
 Assets         Sales  Gross Product Employment  Imports              Exports 
  total goods     
 (share of total ) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Canada 9.0 12.6 13.1 11.1 13.2 32.7 40.5 
Latin Am. Car. 12.3 10.8 10.7 11.7 18.8 16.7 21.4 
Brazil 2.3 3.0 3.2 4.5 4.6 2.0 1.6 
Mexico 1.4 2.8 3.2 2.3 8.1 10.9 15.8 
Argentina 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.1 
Chile 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 
Venezuela 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.7 0.1 
Colombia 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.1 
Costa Rica 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.5 
Ecuador 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Western Hem. 21.3 23.4 23.8 22.7 32.0 49.4 61.9 
Europe 60.1 54.7 54.5 57.3 45.8 26.4 16.0 
Africa 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.7 1.7 0.3 1.6 
Mid.-East 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.4 
Asia-Pac. 16.6 20.0 20.1 17.1 19.7 23.6 20.1 
(Continuation) 
 Assets/ Sales Gross Product/ Net Income/ Imports / Sales Exports/ Sales R.-D./ Sales 
 (percent) Worker (US$) Assets (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) 
Total 1.5 79582 4.6 12.5 10.0 0.85 
 
Canada 1.1 67056 4.6 31.4 31.0 0.84 
Latin Am. Car. 1.7 49287 6.3 19.5 20.0 0.37 
Brazil 1.1 78398 6.2 8.1 5.0 0.83 
Mexico 0.7 22629 9.4 43.1 49.7 0.25 
Argentina 1.3 83379 3.9 8.4 0.9 0.23 
Chile 1.7 70050 6.3 8.5 5.9 0.09 
Venezuela 1.0 40577 7.8 20.6 1.4 0.15 
Colombia 0.9 56637 6.6 9.3 1.7 0.15 
Costa Rica 1.3 21518 10.3 8.8 35.5 0.18 
Ecuador 1.0 21636 0.4 8.4 25.0 0.08 
Western Hem.. 1.3 56593 5.6 26.0 26.1 0.63 
Europe 1.6 99646 4.2 6.1 3.0 1.05 
Africa 1.1 81722 6.6 3.4 12.8 0.13 
Mid.-East 1.6 100746 7.0 7.1 9.7 2.94 
Asia-Pac. 1.2 69178.7 4.9 14.7 10.0 0.6 
Sources : Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, 1998, September; 1999, July. 
 
Canada-Mexico Bilateral Relations 
From the previous collection of data it is arises that, if the image of a hub and spokes so 
often used to represent economic relations between the U.S. and other countries of the 
                                                          
42 Industry Canadas studies show that generally, enterprises under foreign administration in Canada have a better 
performance than enterprises under Canadian administration. 
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continent43 still remains relevant, we must equally consider the fact that a new integrative 
dynamic, implying reorganization and restructuring on a continental scale, had been started in 
the Americas, and in this regard, the implementation of NAFTA constitutes the first step, if 
not the turning point in a process that can only deepen as soon as the domino effect44 working 
in favor of liberalization of trade, spreads whether it is through bilateralism, minilateralism or 
regionalism. In light of these remarks we can now examine more closely bilateral economic 
relations between Canada and Mexico. But before we do, we must make a point about the 
trade data.   
The transit of a major part of the trade by the U.S. indeed complicates the data analysis. If 
we retain the Canadian statistics as a basis of analysis, it is clear that there are major gaps 
between the data from Statistics Canada and that of INEGI45, as is shown in Table 8. The 
numbers for Mexico are much more significant than the Canadian numbers for exports, and 
vice versa for imports. The balance also shows important deviations, with a rising deficit 
when looking at the numbers from Statistic Canada and a more or less stable deficit according 
to INEGI. This issue has been discussed in the setting of bilateral relations between the two 
countries. Actually, these two statistical organizations are working on unifying the data. 
While we wait for more reliable data, we can still examine the trade relation between the two 
countries. 
                                                          
43 Ronald J. WONNACOTT, Trade and Investment in a Hub-and-Spoke System Versus a Free Trade Area, The 
World Economy, 1996, pp. 237-253. 
44 See Richard E. BALDWIN, The Causes of Regionalism, The World Economy, Vol. 20, n∞ 7, November 
1997, pp. 865-888. And, Richard E. BALDWIN, A Domino Theory of Regionalism, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Papers, n∞4465, Cambridge. 
45 The exports column compares the export values according to Statistics Canada and Mexican import values from 
Canada according to INEGI. 
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Table  8 : Canada's Trade with Mexico :  
Comparison of Trade Statistics 
1993-1998, based on Statistics Canada and INEGI statistics, 
 
Can $ millions Exports Imports Trade Balance 
 Stat. Can. INEGI Stat. Can. INEGI Stat. Can. INEGI 
1993 826 1500 3723 1988 -2897 -488 
1994 1083 2185 4525 2034 -3442 151 
1995 1148 1886 5351 2716 -4203 -830 
1996 1252 2385 6034 2968 -4782 -583 
1997 1273 2725 7019 2985 -5746 -260 
1998 1454 3400 7671 na -6217  
Source  : The Canadian Trade Commissioner Service, Canadian Embassy in Mexico, 2000. 
(http://www.infoexport.gc.ca) 
 
Trade exchanges and crossed investments 
Trade between Canada and Mexico was of little significance before the 80s. As we have 
already said, the 80s marked the first turning point in commercial relations between the two 
countries. Trade increased rapidly and the commercial balance, that was up to that point 
positive, soon turned negative for Canada. These relations would take new turn in the 90s. 
NAFTA as well as economic reforms permitted Canada to extend its access in Mexico to 
sectors that were until then protected, particularly the financial and telecommunication 
sectors46. A more confident climate was established, more favourable for trade and 
investments than ever before. Although we can see a considerable growth in trade between 
the two countries since NAFTA as is shown in Figure 2, the growth remains modest. 
                                                          
46 The peso crisis in 1994 resulted in the accelerated opening of the Mexican financial market. Foreign acquisitions 
have been numerous in the bank sector. Two Canadian banks, Scotia Bank and Bank of Montreal, are now present 
in Mexico. Scotia Bank acquired GF Inverlat in 1996 and Bank of Montreal acquired, in 1995, 20 % of 
Bancomers capital. 
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Figure 2 : Canada's Trade and Foreign Direct Investment with Mexico 
$Can. millions, 1993-1998. 
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Sources : Statistics Canada/Statistique Canada, Canadian International Merchandise Trade/Le 
commerce international des marchandises, n° 65-001 ; La balance des paiements internationaux du 
Canada, n° 67-001 ;  
Bilan canadien des investissements internationaux, n° 67-202. 
 
In 1998 Canada ranked 2nd in Mexicos exports market, ahead of Germany and Japan, and 
4th in Mexicos imports, behind the two forementioned countries and behind, of course, the 
U.S. As for Mexico, it ranked 12th in Canadas exports market and 3rd among its importers. 
Mexico is the main destination of Canadian exports in Latin America, with 18.4 % of the 
total for that region in 1998, ahead of Brazil (17.4 %), Chile (4.3 %) and Argentina (4.3 %). 
Between 1993 and 1998, during the first five years of NAFTA, Mexican imports to Canada 
have more than doubled, while exports to Mexico increased more than 65 % according to 
Statistics Canada. In comparison, during the same time period, Canadas imports from the 
U.S. increased 73 % and exports rose more than 80 %. 
At the Canadian provincial level, with more than 50 % of the trade with Mexico, Ontario 
was way ahead of other provinces. Quebec, came in 2nd place in provincial trade, and 
represented in 1998, according to the Institut de la Statistique du Québec, a bit less than 10 % 
of Canadas exports to Mexico and 16 % of Mexican imports. Mexico ranked 19th among the 
principle export markets with a bit less than 0.3% of its total exports and 7th among its main 
suppliers with about 2.3% of its total imports. The statistics vary considerably each year. 
A quick look at investments. 
We estimate the total Canadian direct investment stock in Latin America to be about $45 
billion CAD However, close to 60 % of these investments are located in the tax havens of 
Barbados, Bahamas and Bermuda. With $4.2 billion in investments, Chile remains, outside of 
the tax haven countries aforementioned, the principle destination for Canadian investments in 
this part of the Americas, ahead of Brazil ($2.8 billion), Mexico and Argentina ($2.2 billion 
each). Argentinas share increased even more rapidly from 1990 to 1998 than did Mexicos47. 
To compare, Canadian investment stock in the U.S. rose in 1998 to about $126 billion CAD  
                                                          
47 Statistics Canada, Canadian international investments report, 2000, Cat. 67-202. See also, Nipa BANERJEE, 
Tendances récentes de l'investissement étranger direct : une comparaison entre le Canada et les États-Unis et le 
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Although the data is for obvious reasons unreliable, we estimate nevertheless the amount 
of investments in Canada coming from Latin America to be $3 billion CAD, Mexico leads 
with $0.8 billion, ahead of Brazil ($0.3 billion). Between 1993 and 1998 Mexicos direct 
investments in Canada tripled while Canadas in Mexico quadrupled. In comparison, U.S. 
direct investments in Canada increased 63 % and Canadas in the U.S. went up 86 %48. These 
investments rose to more than $147 billion. 
If we now turn to Mexicos situation, we notice that between 1994 and 1998, Canadian 
investments represented barely 4 % of total foreign investment in the country, which placed 
Canada behind the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany and quite far behind the 
U.S., responsible for 60 % of their foreign direct investments49. In terms of stocks, Canadas 
share in foreign direct investments was in 199, 2.7 %, an increase from 1990 (1.4 %). With 60 
% of the total, the U.S. remains the main investor in Mexico. Nevertheless, Canada became 
the 4th greatest investor in Mexico. It ranked 9th in 1993. Canadian investments in Mexico are 
concentrated mostly in the manufacturing, financial services and mining, operations that are, 
for the most part, concentrated in the centre and along the northern border of Mexico. 
The data reflects undeniably that there has been an increase in trade and crossed 
investments between Canada and Mexico since NAFTA was implemented. Economic ties 
grew closer, yet this does not exclude the fact that, because of the application of the original 
rules, there could have been embezzlement effects. On the other hand, geographical and 
cultural distance, as well as American market attraction are factors which continue to 
discourage the development of more important trade developments between the two 
countries. We may equally ask ourselves what kind of specializations accompany the 
development of these exchanges. 
 
The structure of trade 
Several general conclusions can be drawn regarding structural changes in Canadian trade 
with the foreign market50. First of all, recent studies51 tend to show that the degree of net trade 
opening, as well as the degree of vertical specialization52, increased in all industries, 
particularly in shielded industries and high technology industries. They also show that the 
comparative advantage is prevalent in exports in the primary sectors and in exports outside 
NAFTA. Vertical specialization combined with intra-industry trade development seems to 
prevail in raw materials and industrial goods sectors, automobile, machine and equipment 
sectors, as well as in intra-NAFTA trade, especially with regards to the U.S. Imports and 
exports of technology is another strong trend that is reflected in Canadian external accounts53. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Mexique, Ottawa, La Direction de l'analyse commerciale et économique, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, December 1997, Reference document, n∞2.  
48 Source, Statistics Canada, Canadian international investments report. 
49 ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, January 2000. 
50 For a summary on this topic in Canada, see Pierre-Paul PROULX, Étude spéciale : Les effets de l'ALE et de 
l'ALENA sur les économies canadienne, québécoise et américaine, Institut de la Statistique du Québec, 1999. 
51 Richard DION, Les tendances du commerce extérieur canadien, Revue de la Banque du Canada, winter 1999-
2000, pp. 31-45. See also J.s. LITTLE, US Regional Trade with Canada during the Transition to Free Trade, 
New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, January-February 1996, pp. 3-21. 
52 Vertical specialization index measures the share of imported products by industry in its exports. 
53 See on this topic our study, Christian DEBLOCK and Afef BENESSAIEH, Commerce, croissance et emploi. 
Le cas du Canada (Mexico, to be published 2000). The study shows in particular that, for the three NAFTA 
countries major changes are observed in production, employment and trade. High technology sectors and medium-
high technology sectors concentrated, in 1995, 48.4 % of production and 38.5 % of employment in the 
manufacturing sector in the U.S., 40.5 % of production and 34.7 % of employment in Canada and 35.8 % of 
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Geographical distance and the concentration of trade along the border do not favour the 
development of intra-industry trade between Canada and the U.S. Canadas comparative 
advantage in resources and Mexicos in labour primarily directs the trade between the two 
countries. We notice nevertheless the importance of two sectors in this trade, the automotive 
sector and the material and electrical equipment sector that are strongly transnationalized and 
specialized. The increase in bilateral commercial links in these two sectors well confirms the 
trend towards specialization in the NAFTA zone and, by the same fact, the growing 
importance of intra-industry trade. This seems to confirm the trend in which trade, investment 
and intra-industry specialization go in the same direction in the context of deep integration. 
Canadas main exports to Mexico are motor vehicle parts, agriculture and agro-food 
(seeds, fruit, vegetables, milk products, eggs), electrical machinery, chemical products, wood 
pulp, rubber and plastic products and metallurgic products. Its imports are electrical 
equipment, motor vehicles and parts, furniture, oil, optical equipment, metallurgic products 
and textile products. 
 
Table 9 gives more details on the structure of trade between the two countries. It divides 
this structure into major operation sectors. We have included in the table the structure of 
Canada-U.S. trade. The table shows that agriculture plays an important role in Canadian 
exports to Mexico, even though the export of manufactured products increased. This 
demonstrates that manufactured products play a more important role in imports from Mexico 
than in imports from the U.S. As general information, between the U.S. and Mexico, 
exchanged goods are practically the same; they are almost all concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector, being in machinery and equipment and vehicles categories. 
 
Table 9 : Canada's Trade with U.S. and Mexico, 
by Commodity Groups, 1995, 1997 
 
  1995    1997  
 USA Mexico World  USA Mexico World 
Exports        
Agriculture 11.0 37.3 16.7  11.3 34.8 15.4 
Mining. oil.gas 15.3 8.4 15.6  15.8 6.5 16.2 
Manufacturing 67.9 54.2 62.3  67.0 55.4 62.7 
Others 5.8 0.0 5.5  5.9 3.3 5.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Imports        
Agriculture 7.0 5.7 7.4  6.5 5.4 7.0 
Mining. oil.gas 4.5 3.3 6.9  4.7 4.4 7.3 
Manufacturing 85.8 91.0 82.6  86.2 90.3 82.4 
Others 2.6 0.0 3.1  2.7 0.0 3.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source : WTO, Annual Report, 1998 
 
Commerce and trade diversification 
In opting for Free Trade with the U.S., Canada and Mexicos main objective was to ensure 
a larger and securer access to their main market. With Free Trade they were also aiming to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
production in Mexico. In these countries, the share of these sectors in manufacturing production has increased 
compared to 1985, 1.2 percentage point in the U.S., 4.7 in Canada and 4.9 in Mexico. 
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create a more favorable environment for direct investment. The latter objective was reached, 
as was the former at least partially for Canada. Another objective was identified, thanks to an 
increase in productivity and competitiveness: to increase exports in other international 
markets. Thus, the American market came to play the role of a springboard and lever for a 
better integration into the world economy. 
 On this level, Canada and Mexicos excellent trade results are misleading. Free Trade 
had, it seems, mainly the effect of favoring the regionalization of trade. The American 
economys strength and dynamism are without a doubt the cause. Three other factors seem to 
have also played a part in this : the application of rules of origin, the currency becoming 
extremely favorable for Canada and Mexico and the possible risks of industries and investors 
that are more limited in North American markets than in other markets. We can nevertheless 
question the observed decline in European and Asian markets in Canadas case, as well as the 
mild results of Canadas strategy to promote exports and investments, including those made 
in Mexico. 
Tables 10 and 11 are quite revealing in this regard. 
Table 10 clearly shows that the three NAFTA countries saw their shares in world trade 
more or less increase, especially Mexico and the U.S. However, as it is shown in the bottom 
part of the table, once intra-NAFTA trade was removed, the results are not quite as good as 
they initially seemed. Indeed, even if Mexicos share in world export of goods remains stable, 
the shares of the U.S. and Canada are, on the other hand, decreasing. As for imports, Canada 
and Mexicos shares remain stable, whereas the U.S.s shares are increasing. Of course we 
must consider, in the case of the U.S. in particular, investments abroad and production on site. 
But nevertheless it seems that the three countries are having certain difficulties gaining 
market shares in foreign market as OECD studies tend to confirm. It also seems that, despite 
large increase in trade between them, the three countries continue to be very foreign oriented 
with respect to imports, especially the U.S., which seems to indicate that gains in 
competitiveness, important to Mexico, are still not sufficient to permit a strengthening of 
market shares in the NAFTA zone. 
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Table 10 : U.S., Canada and Mexico : Shares 
in World Trade, 1990, 1990, 1999. 
 
 1990 1995 1999 
 Total (percent of world trade) 
Exports    
 U.S. 11.4 11.5 12.4 
 Canada 3.7 3.8 4.2 
 Mexico 1.2 1.6 2.4 
Imports    
 U.S. 14.6 14.8 18.0 
 Canada 3.5 3.2 3.7 
 Mexico 1.2 1.5 2.5 
  
Intra-NAFTA trade not included 
 
Exports    
 U.S. 8.2 8.1 7.8 
 Canada 0.9 0.7 0.5 
 Mexico 0.4 0.2 0.4 
Imports    
 U.S. 11.1 10.7 12.7 
 Canada 1.2 1.0 1.0 
 Mexico 0.4 0.3 0.6 
     
 
Sources : World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund 
 
Table 11, showing the value of the trade intensity index for the three NAFTA countries, is 
along the same lines. The index is defined as the ratio of export shares of a country in the 
imports of another country to the total shares of exports of the country in world imports54. We 
used the WTO database. The table clearly shows that the effects of proximity and size work in 
favour of the U.S. and of intra-NAFTA trade. But it also shows that market shares of exports 
dropped in other markets, for one, as well as the value of the ratios for intra-NAFTA trade 
does not really show a particular trend in either direction. 
                                                          
54 I = (Xij/Mj)/(Xi/Mw), where i represents the country in question, j the country (or the rest of the world) where 
exports are destined, and w the world. X represents exports and M represents imports. 
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Table 11 : Bilateral Trade Intensity Index 
U.S., Canada and Mexico 
 
  1990 1995 1999 
U.S.   
 Canada 6.1 6.7 6.5 
 Mexico 5.9 5.4 5.0 
 Others 0.7 0.7 0.6 
 
Canada 
  
 U.S 5.2 5.4 4.8 
 Mexico 0.3 0.3 0.2 
 Others 0.2 0.2 0.1 
 
Mexico 
  
 U.S 4.7 5.7 4.7 
 Canada 0.2 0.8 0.4 
 Others 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Source : World Trade Organization 
 
It is also interesting to look at the results of Canadas exports in prioritized sectors. With 
Team Canada, Canada has a strategy targeted towards a certain number of markets and 
priority sectors. Ten sectors have been identified, among which are the automobile sector, 
information and communication technologies, agro-food, aerospace, defence, health, plastics, 
etc. This list being subject to change, it is hard to evaluate Canadas performance in export 
matters at the time. Nevertheless, this analysis can provide some pieces of information.   
Studies conducted by Team Canada in 1998 showed that reserved sectors saw their shares 
go down between 1990 and 1997 from 59.9 % to 57.8 % of Canadas total exports. For the 
U.S., this share went from 61.1 % to 58.1 % of total exports to that country. The contrary is 
true for Mexico, whose share went up from 62.4 % to 69.6 %55. A more recent study, on the 
other hand, indicates that between 1990 and 1998, on the basis of the new priorities, shares of 
the priority sector in total exports went from a little less than 47 % to close to 50 %56. For 
Latin America, taken in its entirety, this share went from 54.4 % to 65.5 % of total exports to 
this region during the same period. The trend is the same for Mexico, but it is much more 
modest. We must mention that the agro-food and automobile sectors alone, with 45.9 % and 
23.9 % of the total, concentrated close to 70 % of priority exports. Many sectors, such as 
aerospace, environment and health, still showed decreases between 1990 and 1998. 
In fact, overall Canadas trade performance is perhaps not quite as spectacular at first 
sight as statistics or official speeches assert. The improvement in competitiveness of the 
Canadian economy and its adaptation to economic trends in international markets is 
undeniable. As is shown in Table 11, from 1980 to 1995 trade by the three NAFTA countries, 
Mexico in particular, has become considerably diversified57. If it were possible to evaluate 
                                                          
55 Team Canada, Data on trade and investment, International Affairs Directorate/ Policy Analysis Branch, Industry 
Canada,1998. 
56 Team Canada, The Trade and Investment Monitor, Autumn-Winter, 1999-2000, 
http://www.strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_economy/mera/engdoc/08.html 
57 Index, the range is between 0 and 1. The closer it is to 0, the more trade is diversified. 
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which of Mexico or Canada benefited more from NAFTA, numbers indicate that on the level 
of trade, as in its pro-active trade policy, Mexico put all its efforts into diversifying its trade 
partners and became a major player in the hemispheric chessboard. However, the strategic 
partnership that Canada wanted to implement with Mexico to improve relations in Latin 
America demands additional efforts. For Canada, as outlined by OECD in its 1998 Canadian 
economic Study, Canadas structural performance is, compared to other countries such as the 
U.S, mediocre58. We believe it is not quite as mediocre as the organization stated, but it is 
far from being entirely satisfactory59. The breakthrough of exports in certain promising 
sectors is also notable. However, we can wonder if the results obtained are worth the efforts 
taken in exports, as well as in investments in the new economy. We may also question 
whether the constant deterioration of Canadas trade balance with Mexico is perhaps in reality 
an indicator of certain bad effects of free trade. Favouring a deep integration in the NAFTA 
area, free trade would accentuate the strengths and the weaknesses of countries on the level of 
competitive advantage. This is only a hypothesis, but reflects actual concerns of the Canadian 
government in issues of investments, productivity, and more aggressive formation and 
penetration in exports markets, as it is shown in this recent trade document60. 
 
 
Table 12: Concentration and "Diversification" Indices of Exports 
Mexico, Canada and U.S., 1990, 1994, 1995 
 
 Diversification Index Concentration Index 
 1980 1994 1995 1980 1994 1995 
 
Mexico 0.523 0.397 0.384 0.475 0.129 0.121 
Canada 0.513 0.410 0.391 0.109 0.139 0.134 
U.S. 0.426 0.272 0.262 0.064 0.073 0.068 
Source : UNCTD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics. 
Note : Both indices range between 0 and 1, with the latter representing the most extreme 
concentration. 
 
                                                          
58 See the special issue in which Canadian Journal of Economics examines the issue of productivity : Vol. 32, 
n∞2. April 1999 
59 John, McCALLUM, ÏALE : un traité deux-étoilesÓ, Econoscope, Banque Royale du Canada, vol. 23, n∞ 6, 
1999 
60 On this topic, see DFAIT/MAECI, Ouverture sur le monde. Priorités canadiennes en matiÀre d'accÀs aux 
marchés internationaux 2000, Ottawa, Avril 2000. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this text we discussed economic relations between Canada and Mexico on two 
levels : first on the political level and then on the level of statistical facts. On both 
levels, there have been significant changes since the implementation of NAFTA. On 
the political level, Mexico became Canadas strategic partner and on the economic 
level, it became Canadas main trade partner in Latin America. All evidence seems 
to indicate that intergovernmental cooperation and trade between the two countries 
shall develop and deepen even more in the coming future. 
It appears, however, on the political level that this closer cooperation between the 
two countries is faced with three problems or challenges. The first of these problems 
comes from being the neighbour with a powerful country, the U.S, who have much 
bigger hemispheric and international ambitions than Canada and with whom, 
considering the particular and privileged relationship that Canada and Mexico have 
with this country, Canada must cope more and more on the diplomatic scene as well 
as on the trade scene. The second problem is related to the fact that Canadas trade 
strategy, focused, similarly to Mexicos, on trade promotion and international 
investment as a growth engine, tends more to assert in this partnership Canadas 
economic interests than Canadian values, culture and institutions. Finally, the last 
problem is that this partnership concerns two fundamentally different countries: one 
with an advanced economy, and the other with an emerging economy. 
On the economic level, it appears that the development of relations by Canada 
and its Southern partner is also facing three problems. The first problem is that, so 
far, trade relations between the two countries are mainly developed outside of the 
relations that each of them have with the U.S, which is becoming weightier for both 
their respective economies. The second problem comes from the fact that, in a deep 
integration context, both countries are placed in a systematic rivalry situation, 
whether on the level of foreign investment attractiveness or on the level of intra-
industry specializations within multinationals production affiliates. Lastly, the third 
problem is that both countries more or less did not succeed as they wished to 
improve their trade position in other major markets of the world economy. 
It appears, so far, that these problems have been largely underestimated by the 
Canadian government and eclipsed by the trade concerns. The excellent trade results 
with the U.S. and the good climate between Canada and Mexico have clouded the 
image of this relation and brought about satisfaction regarding the implemented 
strategy, whether in regards with Mexico in particular or Latin America in general, 
which seems to be an exaggeration in the present context. Economic trends tend, on 
the contrary, to show certain worrying signs, beginning with the trade level. Having 
developed quickly, Canada-Mexico economic relations remain quite limited and 
increasingly negative for Canada, which would tend to confirm the thesis of those 
who, like Parragariya or Bhagwati, contest the Krugman hypothesis of natural trade 
zones. If Canada and Mexico can be considered natural partners of the U.S., the 
same is not true for the two countries together.  
Too much concerned with its interests in trade, Canada, until now, did not 
sufficiently prove that it was able to exploit its « sympathy advantage » with other 
Latin American countries in order to assert its own values, to get much closer to its 
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other partners in the Americas and to make cooperation between countries better 
balanced and more concerned about the values, social rights and economic rights of 
all countries involved. If the idea of a community of the Americas must arise, it is 
important that Canada shows more audacity and initiative, even if it would bring 
about tension in its privileged relation with the U.S. The partnership relation that 
Canada wishes to develop with Mexico could be, in this case, a test. In other words, 
if NAFTA indeed created a new dynamic in bilateral relations between Canada and 
Mexico, it is now time for Canada to focus on this dynamic in a more material 
direction. First by giving a more solid foundation to economic relations between the 
two countries, which has not been the case so far; and secondly by having a more 
positive turn to their bilateral cooperation, which would demand the discussion of 
issues of common interest from a perspective that is less national and more regional. 
 
 
